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Nichols and Mauroni: In My View

IN MY VIEW

A DISSERVICE TO RUSSIAN DEMOCRATS

Sir:
I am pleased that in his review of my book, The Russian Presidency (Naval War
College Review, Summer 2001, pp. 165–8), Sergei Khrushchev agreed with me
(and we are among a very few in the scholarly community who have agreed on
this issue) that presidentialism will serve Russia better than the parliamentary
alternative. But elsewhere, Dr. Khrushchev disagrees with me, and I am writing
not only to clarify to readers of the Review the nature of that disagreement
but also to take issue with places where I believe he has mischaracterized the
book.
First, it is understandable that Dr. Khrushchev objects to my argument that
the current state of affairs in Russia is largely the result of the horrific policies of
the Soviet era. His father helped to build, and then headed, the Soviet system,
and no one can blame Dr. Khrushchev if filial loyalty hampers his objective evaluation of that era. However, he is flatly wrong when he writes that placing the
blame on the Soviets is “a usual mistake of Western studies.” Even a cursory
reading of Western academic opinion reveals that most scholars (many of
whom, ironically, are ardent fans of socialism) think the problem with Russia is
the current environment of capitalism, not the legacy of Soviet authoritarianism.
Dr. Khrushchev may not like the latter argument, but it is in no way a typical one.
Likewise, his assertion that “seventy years of Soviet rule did not change the
Russians” is staggering; the Soviet system not only increased levels of urbanization and education but also, let us never forget, murdered tens of millions of
people. To say that this did not change the Russians or have an impact on current
Russian political culture defies the evidence as well as common sense.
Also, a few matters of fact are worth clearing up. Dr. Khrushchev asserts that I
paint figures like Ruslan Khasbulatov in “exclusively dark tones.” I realize—and I
say in the book—that Yeltsin and Khasbulatov represent two visions of the future of Russia. But the fact remains that Khasbulatov tried to ignite civil war (he
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called on the army to mutiny) and shared a podium during the 1993 standoff
with a renegade general who promised to see to it that Yeltsin’s supporters would
“wash in their own blood.” If there is a lighter way to depict such people, it will
have to come from a more imaginative author than I.
The review also claims that “Nichols declares it to be well known that [Vladimir] Zhirinovsky and his party have always been controlled by the government.”
I said nothing so categorical. I noted, in a footnote regarding the late 1990s, that
it is widely believed in Moscow’s political circles that Zhirinovsky had been
bought off by the government with special perks and that this had made him a
less credible opposition figure.
Finally, Dr. Khrushchev writes that my drawing of a distinction between
Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin was “propagandistic,” “used without concrete evidence,” and “inadmissible,” that it “reduce[d]
confidence in the author.” (By contrast, he writes that “Lukashenko is the very
image of Yeltsin.”) If calling Russia democratic and Belarus authoritarian is
“propagandistic,” then it is propaganda that has been engaged in by the United
States, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe. As I noted in The Russian Presidency, the OSCE said in 1997 that
Lukashenko was “constructing a system of totalitarian government” and that
both the OSCE and the EU found the voting procedures in Belarus so clearly
rigged that they refused to send election observers. In Russia, American and European observers alike certified the voting in both the 1996 and 2000 elections to
be free and fair, despite occasional irregularities. If Dr. Khrushchev finds such
judgments “inadmissible,” I suggest that his quarrel is with the many observers
from the Western democracies and not with me.
The real problem in the review is that Dr. Khrushchev, like so many Russians who
cast a cynical eye on events after 1991, sweepingly dismisses Russian political life as
“merely reflections of a struggle for national power among oligarchic-criminal
groups that emerged as a result of fraudulent privatization.” That is a disservice to
the many Russian democrats who are trying, however imperfectly, to build a new
political system. But more disturbingly, if that is his starting point for analysis, then
any book on Russian politics, save one that is completely and scathingly critical of
every institutional change and political event in Moscow, will inevitably fail to meet
his standard of acceptability.
The fact remains that ten years after the Soviet collapse, democracy and its institutions survive and are deepening in Russia. Especially at such a crucial time
in history, when it is imperative during our war against terror to separate the civilized nations who might be our allies from the malefactors who are our enemies,
the readers of the Naval War College Review deserve a more judicious discussion
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of events in Russia than the relentless (and unfounded) pessimism represented
by Dr. Khrushchev.

THOMAS M. NICHOLS

Department of Strategy and Policy
Naval War College

CB IN DESERT STORM: SUFFICIENT CONDEMNATION

Sir:
While I appreciate Lieutenant Commander Pietro D. Marghella’s notes on my
“meticulous and forthright discussion” of chemical and biological (CB) warfare
during the Gulf War (Naval War College Review, Summer 2001, pp. 172–3), I take
exception to some of his criticisms.
My book did use acronyms extensively and was focused on the Army’s contributions to CB defense. The book was written to inform the members of the
Army community who do not know that the Chemical Corps had an effective
defense capability for the armed forces during this conflict, especially those misled by the media and other critics to believe we had little or no defensive capability during the Gulf War. Frankly, I had no good contacts in the other services
with whom to talk about their CB defense efforts. But I will note for the record
that in 1990 the Army had the most credible operational and logistics capability in that area; the other services were very unprepared, due to their parochial approaches in developing service-specific CB defense—none more so than
the Navy, with its unique chemical detectors, chemical suits, and biodetection
research-and-development program, and lack of any decontamination capability. The unpreparedness among the services is the reason Congress directed a
joint program approach by the four services in 1994, the services having continued their separate acquisition efforts after the war.
Marghella takes issue with my use of the term “weapons of mass disruption.”
I contend that CB weapons are mass casualty agents only if used as long-line
resources against an unprotected population, as General John J. Pershing noted
after World War I. How many people did sarin kill in the Tokyo subways in 1995?
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Twelve. How many people has anthrax killed (as of late October) in the terrorist
letter campaign that began in September 2001? A very few (four victims to date).
How many lives did these acts disrupt? Tens of thousands. Our failure to acknowledge this simple fact has caused the logjams in defense policy and continued failures to model and simulate the realistic effects of CB agents.
I am sorry Marghella takes issue with my treatment of medical topics. I did
not mean to imply that the doctors and medical specialists could not recognize
chemical and biological casualties (although there was an acknowledged intensive education effort conducted during DESERT SHIELD). What we lacked as a
force was the ability to treat and evacuate mass casualties; we had no ability to
decontaminate and move contaminated human remains; and we certainly had a
very limited biological vaccine capability. The 101st Airborne Division’s commander flatly asserted that it would have been better to have no vaccines than
enough for only a third of the force. That in itself should be sufficient condemnation of our medical capability during the Gulf War.
Last, Marghella says the United States “never considered the use of chemical
weapons in the Gulf War.” This is flatly untrue. The Defense Department leadership, with Army Chemical Corps advisors, discussed the chemical option as a
counter to Iraq’s chemical weapons threat and decided against it. The department’s policy envisioning the use of chemical weapons had been negated only by
the U.S. signature of the Chemical Warfare Convention. My sources were in the
room where the discussion took place and participated in it; I doubt that
Marghella’s could say the same.

ALBERT J. MAURONI

Senior Policy Analyst, Analytic Services, Inc.
Washington, D.C.
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